

## **Соціальна складова програм і діяльності та електоральні успіхи християнсько-демократичних партій у країнах центрально-східної Європи (1990–2014)**

Розглянуто феномен християнсько-демократичних партій та їх ідеологій загалом і в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи. Визначено соціальну складову (соціальну базу та соціальні питання) програм і діяльності християнсько-демократичних партій у країнах Центрально-Східної Європи, а також її вплив на електоральні/урядові успіхи християнсько-демократичних партій. Здійснено порівняльний аналіз електоральних успіхів християнсько-демократичних партій у Центрально-Східній Європі у період 1990–2014 рр.

*Ключові слова:* політична партія, християнська демократія, християнсько-демократична партія, соціальна складова партій, електоральні успіхи партій, ідеологічне позиціонування партій, Центрально-Східна Європа.

## **Social dimensions of programs and activities and electoral success of christian democratic parties in central and eastern europe (1990–2014)**

The article is dedicated to analyzing the phenomenon of Christian Democratic parties and their ideologies in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The author has determined social dimensions (social base and social issues) of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern Europe, as well as its impact on electoral/cabinet success of liberal parties; carried out the comparative analysis of the electoral success of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern Europe in 1990–2014.

*Keywords:* political party, the Christian democracy, Christian Democratic Party, social dimensions of party, electoral success of party, ideological positioning of party, Central and Eastern Europe.

Before and after the collapse of the USSR and the regimes of the so-called “*real socialism*” in the post-socialist Central-Eastern European countries<sup>1</sup> (which at that time were called

<sup>1</sup> The notion “Central-Eastern Europe” now covers all former authoritarian/post-totalitarian countries (or those parts of the countries, which today are independent) that geographically belong to Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe, which till the end of the

Eastern European countries) appeared a range of new political parties, which criticized the socialist system of social relations, in fact stepping on the way of economic liberalism and the state of general welfare. Consequently, the most popular among electorate became social-democratic, liberal and to a lesser extent conservative political parties. However, some popularity acquired the so-called Christian Democratic parties, which differed from the mainstream parties in their vision of social development and movement. Moreover, Christian Democratic parties in the region have been often formed in accordance with West European patterns, where the phenomenon of Christian democracy is stable and rather successful from the point of view of electorate. Taking this into consideration, as the institutional experience proves, Christian Democratic parties have been approved in all Central-Eastern European countries. But not in all countries of the region they must be interpreted as the identical ones, in the light of the social constituent of their programs and activity, as well as in the context of achieved electoral success. The aim of the current paper is to distinguish differences between the social constituent and electoral results of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern European countries.

*Problematics* of the program and ideological direction, especially the social constituent of programs and activities, and electoral successes of Christian Democratic parties in general (not only in Central-Eastern European countries) has been described in a number of scientific research, among which, the most famous have been conducted by: P. Mair and C. Mudde<sup>2</sup>, M. Caciagli, L. De Winter, A. Mintzel, J. B. Culla and A. De Brouwer<sup>3</sup>, M. P. Fogarty<sup>4</sup>, D. Hanley<sup>5</sup>, R. Irving<sup>6</sup>, S. Kalyvas<sup>7</sup>, J. Madeley<sup>8</sup>, M. Gallagher, M. Laver and P. Mair<sup>9</sup>, R. Katz and

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80s – beginning of the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had been under the USSR's influence, and as a result of the reforms, conducted in the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, managed to democratize and largely approached European political values. Among them are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia. Sometimes such post-communist countries as Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are referred to Central-Eastern Europe. In our paper we analyze only those Central-Eastern European countries, which both are parliamentary democracies and during 2004-2013 became the members of the EU. Here belong Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. See: C. Lerman, G. Feder, *Agriculture in Transition: Land Policies and Evolving Farm Structures in Post-Soviet Countries*, Wyd. Lexington Books 2004, s. 4.; J. Swinnen, *Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Ashgate 1997.

<sup>2</sup> P. Mair, C. Mudde, *The party family and its study*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 1998, vol 1, s. 211–229.

<sup>3</sup> M. Caciagli, L. De Winter, A. Mintzel, J. B. Culla, A. De Brouwer, *Christian Democracy in Europe*, Barcelona 1992.

<sup>4</sup> M. P. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe 1820-1953*, Wyd. Routledge & Kegan Paul 1957.

<sup>5</sup> D. Hanley, *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. Pinter 1994.; D. Hanley, *Christian democracy and the paradoxes of Europeanization. Flexibility, competition and collusion*, „Party Politics“ 2002, vol 8, nr 4, s. 463–481.

<sup>6</sup> R. E. M. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*, Wyd. Allen & Unwin 1979.

<sup>7</sup> S. N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1996.; S. N. Kalyvas, K. van Kersbergen, *Christian Democracy*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 2010, vol 13, s. 183–209.; S. N. Kalyvas, *From pulpit to party. Party formation and the Christian democratic phenomenon*, „Comparative Politics“ 1998, vol 31, nr 3, s. 293–312.

<sup>8</sup> J. Madeley, *Scandinavian Christian democracy: throwback or portent*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1977, vol 5, nr 3, s. 267–286.

<sup>9</sup> M. Gallagher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Modern Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill 1995.

P. Mair<sup>10</sup>, S. Hix and C. Lord<sup>11</sup>, F. Jacobs<sup>12</sup>, V. McHale<sup>13</sup>, D. Seiler<sup>14</sup>, G. Pridham<sup>15</sup>, J.-C. Delbreil<sup>16</sup>, R. Leonardi and D. A. Wertman<sup>17</sup>, W. Beke<sup>18</sup>, I. Budge, H. D. Klingemann and A. Volkens<sup>19</sup>, T. Frey<sup>20</sup>, S. Mainwaring and T. Scully<sup>21</sup>, S. van Hecke and E. Gerard<sup>22</sup>, J. Gilmour<sup>23</sup>, K. Krzywicka and E. Olszewski<sup>24</sup>, E. Lamberts<sup>25</sup>, O. Hennig and K. Weigelt<sup>26</sup> and others.

Problematics of essence, historical development and prospects of Christian democracy as a political ideology has been revealed in the papers by the following scholars: T. Kselman and J. Buttigieg<sup>27</sup>, P. Chenux<sup>28</sup>, T. Buchanan and M. Conway<sup>29</sup>, W. Kaiser, H. Wohnout and M. Gehler<sup>30</sup>, M. Vincent<sup>31</sup>, R. J. Wolff and J. K. Hoensch<sup>32</sup>, J. Chappel<sup>33</sup>, J. Dagnino<sup>34</sup>, G.-

<sup>10</sup> R. S. Katz, P. Mair, *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Sage 1994.

<sup>11</sup> S. Hix, C. Lord, *Political Parties in the European Union*, Wyd. Macmillan 1997.

<sup>12</sup> F. Jacobs, *Western European Political Parties: A Comprehensive Guide*, Wyd. Longman 1989.

<sup>13</sup> V. E. McHale, *Political Parties of Europe*, Wyd. Greenwood 1983.

<sup>14</sup> D. L. Seiler, *Partis et Familles Politiques*, Wyd. Presses Univ. de France 1980; D. L. Seiler, *De la classification des partis politiques*, „Res Publica“ 1985, vol 27, nr 1, s. 59–86.; D. L. Seiler, *De la Comparaison des Partis Politiques*, Wyd. Economica 1986.

<sup>15</sup> G. Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945-1976*, London 1977.

<sup>16</sup> J.-C. Delbreil, *Centrisme et démocratie-chrétienne en France: le Parti démocrate populaire des origines au MRP, 1919-1944*, Paris 1990.

<sup>17</sup> R. Leonardi, D. A. Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy: the Politics of Dominance*, Basingstoke 1989.

<sup>18</sup> W. Beke, *De ziel van een zuil: De Christelijke Volkspartij, 1945-1968*, Leuven 2005.; W. Beke, *Living apart together: Christian democracy in Belgium*, [w:] S. van Hecke, E. Gerard (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, Wyd. Leuven University Press 2004, s. 133–158.

<sup>19</sup> I. Budge, H. D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, E. Tannenbaum, *Mapping Policy Preferences: Parties, Electors and Governments 1945–1998: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments 1945–1998*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.

<sup>20</sup> T. Frey, *Die Christdemokratie in Westeuropa: der schmale Grat zum Erfolg*, Wyd. Nomos 2009.

<sup>21</sup> S. Mainwaring, T. Scully, *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 2003.

<sup>22</sup> S. van Hecke, E. Gerard (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, Wyd. Leuven University Press 2004.

<sup>23</sup> J. Gilmour, *Losing its soul: The changing role of Christian democracy in the development of Spain's new right*, „South European Society and Politics“ 2005, vol 10, s. 411–431.

<sup>24</sup> K. Krzywicka, E. Olszewski, *Christian Democracy in the Modern World*, Wyd. Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press 2000.

<sup>25</sup> E. Lamberts, *Christian Democracy in the European Union, 1945–1995*, Wyd. Leuven University Press 1997.

<sup>26</sup> O. Hennig, K. Weigelt, *50 Jahre Christliche Demokratie in Lateinamerika*, [w:] *Internationale Zusammenarbeit – Herausforderung für Politik und Gesellschaft*, Wyd. Bornheim 1997, s. 8–17.

<sup>27</sup> T. Kselman, J. Buttigieg, *European Christian Democracy: historical legacies and comparative perspectives*, Wyd. Notre Dame 2003.; T. Kselman, J. Buttigieg, *European Christian Democracies: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*, Wyd. University of Notre Dame Press 2003.

<sup>28</sup> P. Chenux, *Une Europe vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome*, Brussels 1990.

<sup>29</sup> T. Buchanan, M. Conway, *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918-1965*, Oxford 1996.; M. Conway, *Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918-1945*, London and New York 1997.; M. Conway, *Building the Christian City. Catholics and politics in inter-war francophone Belgium*, „Past and Present“ 1990, vol 128, s. 117–151.

<sup>30</sup> W. Kaiser, H. Wohnout, *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918-45*, London 2004.; W. Kaiser, M. Gehler, *Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945*, London 2004.; W. Kaiser, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of the European Union*, Cambridge 2007.; M. Gehler, W. Kaiser, H. Wohnout, *Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert/Christian Democracy in 20th Century Europe/La Démocratie Chrétienne en Europe au XXe siècle*, Wyd. Böhlau 2001.

<sup>31</sup> M. Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 1930-1936*, Oxford 1996.

<sup>32</sup> R. J. Wolff, J. K. Hoensch, *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right, 1919-1945*, Boulder 1987.

<sup>33</sup> J. Chappel, *The Catholic Origins of Totalitarianism Theory in Interwar Europe*, „Modern Intellectual History“ 2011, vol 8, s. 561–590.

<sup>34</sup> J. Dagnino, *The Intellectuals of Italian Catholic Action and the Sacralisation of Politics in 1930s Europe*, „Contemporary European History“ 2012, vol 21, s. 215–233.

R. Horn and E. Gerard<sup>35</sup>, S. Schloesser<sup>36</sup>, L. Kenis, J. Billiet and P. Pasture<sup>37</sup>, A. Altinordu<sup>38</sup>, T. Cary<sup>39</sup>, F. Duncan<sup>40</sup>, S. Kahl<sup>41</sup>, R. J. Granieri<sup>42</sup>, M. Einaudi and F. Goguel<sup>43</sup>, H. Keman and P. Pennings<sup>44</sup>, S. van Dyk and M. Roggenkamp<sup>45</sup>, K. van Kersbergen<sup>46</sup>, M. Seeleib-Kaiser, G. Vecchio<sup>47</sup>, C. Warner<sup>48</sup>, E. L. Evans<sup>49</sup> and others.

In the context of Central-Eastern European countries, Christian democracy and the reasons which stipulated for its appearance in this or that format, have been in the focus of such researchers as: T. Bale and A. Szczerbiak<sup>50</sup>, S. N. Kalyvas and K. van Kersbergen<sup>51</sup>, R. Bender<sup>52</sup>,

<sup>35</sup> G.-R. Horn, E. Gerard, *Left Catholicism. Catholics and Society in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation*, Leuven 2001.

<sup>36</sup> S. Schloesser, *Against Forgetting: Memory, History, Vatican II*, „Theological Studies” 2006, vol LXVII, s. 275–319.

<sup>37</sup> L. Kenis, J. Billiet, P. Pasture, *The Transformation of the Christian Churches in Western Europe 1945-2000*, Leuven 2010.

<sup>38</sup> A. Altinordu, *The incorporation of religious politics: political Catholicism and political Islam in comparison*, Wyd. Yale University 2009.

<sup>39</sup> T. Cary, *The Path to Christian Democracy: German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1996.

<sup>40</sup> F. Duncan, *A decade of Christian democratic decline: the dilemmas of the CDU, OVP and CDA in the 1990s*, „Government and Opposition” 2006, vol 41, nr 4, s. 469–490.

<sup>41</sup> S. Kahl, *The religious roots of modern poverty policy: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Protestant traditions compared*, „European Journal of Sociology” 2005, vol 46, nr 1, s. 91–126.

<sup>42</sup> R. J. Granieri, *Politics in C minor: the CDU/CSU between Germany and Europe since the secular sixties*, „Central European History” 2009, vol 42, nr 1, s. 1–32.

<sup>43</sup> M. Einaudi, F. Goguel, *Christian Democracy in Italy and France*, Wyd. University of Notre Dame Press 1952.

<sup>44</sup> H. Keman, P. Pennings, *Competition and coalescence in European party systems: social democracy and Christian democracy moving into the 21st century*, „Swiss Political Science Review” 2006, vol 12, nr 2, s. 95–126.

<sup>45</sup> M. Seeleib-Kaiser, S. van Dyk, M. Roggenkamp, *Party Politics and Social Welfare: Comparing Christian and Social Democracy in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands*, Wyd. Edward Elgar 2008.

<sup>46</sup> K. van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Wyd. Routledge 1995.; K. van Kersbergen, *Contemporary Christian democracy and the demise of the politics of mediation*, [w:] H. Kitschelt, G. Marks, P. Lange, J. D. Stephens (eds.), *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 346–370.; K. van Kersbergen, *The Christian democratic phoenix and modern unsecular politics*, „Party Politics” 2008, vol 14, nr 3, s. 259–280.; K. van Kersbergen, A. Hemerijck, *Christian democracy, social democracy and the continental 'welfare without work' syndrome*, „Social Policy Review” 2004, vol 16, s. 167–186.

<sup>47</sup> G. Vecchio, *La democrazia cristiana in Europa (1891–1963)*, Wyd. Mursia 1979.

<sup>48</sup> C. M. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group. The Catholic Church and Political Parties in Europe*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2000.

<sup>49</sup> E. L. Evans, *The cross and the ballot: Catholic political parties in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, 1785-1985*, Wyd. Humanities Press 1999.

<sup>50</sup> T. Bale, A. Szczerbiak, *Why is there no Christian democracy in Poland – and why should we care?*, „Party Politics”, 2008, vol 14, nr 4, s. 479–500.

<sup>51</sup> S. N. Kalyvas, K. van Kersbergen, *Christian Democracy*, „Annual Review of Political Science” 2010, vol 13, s. 185–186.

<sup>52</sup> R. Bender, *Kościół katolicki w Polsce odrodzonej*, in Janusz Żarnowski, *Życie polityczne w Polsce: 1918-1939*, Wyd. Zakład Narodowy im Ossolińskich 1985.

M. Eberts<sup>53</sup>, A. Korbonski<sup>54</sup>, A. Karatnycky<sup>55</sup>, K. Chan<sup>56</sup>, R. Monticone<sup>57</sup>, S. Stępień<sup>58</sup>, A. Grzymala-Busse<sup>59</sup>, Z. Enyedi<sup>60</sup> and others.

*Modern Christian Democratic parties* (to a greater extent in Western European and Latin American countries, to a lesser extent in Central-Eastern and Eastern European countries) are derivative form catholic confessional parties, which appeared in the 2<sup>nd</sup> part of the 19<sup>th</sup> – 1<sup>st</sup> part of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. They were formed on the basis of antiliberal and antisocial mass catholic movement, which challenged the supremacy of liberalism in Europe in "fundamentalist" and theoretical perspective. Thus, primarily Christian democracy was positioned as an opposition to liberal democracy. At the same time, Christian Democratic parties appeared to be separated from the catholic church. It was promoted by the principles of democracy which were steady in different countries. And this contributed to the fact, that soon Christian Democratic parties realized, that their interests lay in consolidation and further extension of the principles of parliamentary and electoral democracy, i.e. those institutions, which helped Christian Democratic parties to gain social and political authority<sup>61</sup>. Consequently, two implications of Christian Democratic parties formation have become apparent. *First of all*, these parties approved religion in the context of their fundamental element and its identity, but religion appeared to be rather an obstacle, than an advantage. *Secondly*, an appeal to religion transformed Christian Democratic parties into non-homogeneous coalitions of interested groups (groups of interest), mainly united by the initial adherence to religion. It makes many scientists state, that Christian Democratic parties appeared not as a result of desire/will of the organized church, but in opposition to the organized structure of the church<sup>62</sup>. Correspondingly, Christian Democratic parties have been determined as anticonservative. It is clearly described by the fact, that in the left-right ideological spectrum, Christian Democratic parties are positioned as right-centrist (centrist-right), because they are conventionally placed between liberal and conservative political parties. In fact, Christian Democrats occupy *an intermediate position between liberal and conservative parties*, what marks their program and activity rhetoric, and distinguishes some issues, including social ones<sup>63</sup>. Such

<sup>53</sup> M. Eberts, *The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland*, „Europe-Asia Studies“ 1998, vol 50, s. 817–842.

<sup>54</sup> A. Korbonski, *Poland ten years after: the church*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies“ 2000, vol 33, s. 123–146.

<sup>55</sup> A. Karatnycky, *Christian Democracy Resurgent: Raising the Banner of Faith in Eastern Europe*, „Foreign Affairs“ 1998, vol 77, s. 13–18.

<sup>56</sup> K. K.-L. Chan, *The religious base of politics in post-Communist Poland: A case of bounded secularisation*, [w:] D. Broughton, H.-M. ten Napel (eds.), *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*, Wyd. Routledge 2000, s. 176–197.

<sup>57</sup> R. Monticone, *The Catholic Church in Communist Poland 1945-1985: Forty Years of Church-State Relations*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

<sup>58</sup> S. Stępień, *Christian-Democratic Movement in Poland (1945-1989)*, [w:] K. Krzywicka, E. Olszewski (eds.), *Christian Democracy in the Modern World*, Wyd. Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Press 2000, s. 215–235.

<sup>59</sup> A. Grzymala-Busse, *Why There is (Almost) no Christian Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*, University of Michigan 2010.

<sup>60</sup> Z. Enyedi, *The contested politics of positive neutrality in Hungary*, „West European Politics“ 2003, vol 26, nr 1.

<sup>61</sup> S. N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1996.

<sup>62</sup> S. N. Kalyvas, K. van Kersbergen, *Christian Democracy*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 2010, vol 13, s. 185–186.

<sup>63</sup> Earlier Christian-democratic parties were not singled out as a separate family of ideological parties. As opposed they were determined

a conclusion nowadays is peculiar of Christian Democratic parties in both “old” (Western), and “new” (Central-Eastern and Eastern) European countries. Thus, it is necessary to carry out in detail political analysis of Christian Democratic parties, their social problematics and electoral success in Central-Eastern European countries.

First Christian Democratic parties within the historical boundaries of *modern Central-Eastern European countries* appeared at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> – beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Among them one can name: the Democratic Party (DP) in Bulgaria, the Christian and Democratic Union – People’s Party (KDU-CSL) in the Czech Republic and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LKDP). In Hungary the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) was created during WWII (1943). After the establishment of the “real socialism” regimes, these parties were mostly ruined and renewed their activity at the late 80s – early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the Soviet regime and regimes in the USSR’s satellites collapsed. At that time, new Christian Democratic parties in all countries of Central-Eastern Europe started their formation. Among them, in Bulgaria – the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), in the Czech republic – the Christian Democratic Union (KDS), in Estonia – the Estonian Christian Democrats (EKD), in Latvia – the Christian Democratic Union (KDS), in Lithuania – the Christian Democratic Union (KDS), the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA), in Poland – the Christian and Nationalistic Union (ZChN), the Party of Christian Democrats (PCD), the Centre of Comprehension (PC), the Christian Democracy (ChD), the Electoral Action of Catholics (WAK), the Movement for the Republic (RdR), the Non-Party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (BBWR), the Catholic Electoral Committee “Homeland” (O), the Electoral Action “Solidarity” (AWS), the National Christian and Democratic Bloc for Poland (NCD – BdP), in Romania – the Christian Democratic National People’s Party (PNT-CD), the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR), the New Generation Party – Christian Democrats (PNG-CD), in Slovakia – the Democratic Party (DS), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM), the Christian Social Union (KSU), the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), in Slovenia – the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), the Christian Socialists (KS). Some more parties have been formed since 2000 up to nowadays (despite the fact, that a large number of Christian Democratic parties, which had been created earlier, stopped their activity). Among them: the Croatian Growth (HR), the “Pro Patria” and “Republic” Union (IRL) in Estonia, the Christian Conservative Social Union (KKSS), the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) and the Christian Party (KP) in Lithuania, the National Electoral Committee

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as the parties “on the crossroads”, conservative parties or parties, determined by pragmatism and opportunism. This distinctive position can be observed much more rarely nowadays. For instance, see: H. Kriesi, E. Grande, R. Lachat, M. Dolezal, S. Bornschieer, T. Frey, *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2008.; R. S. Katz, W. J. Crotty, *Handbook of Party Politics*, Wyd. Sage 2006. The situation changed, when the Christian democratic party was analyzed in theoretical and comparative perspective. In particular, see: K. van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Wyd. Routledge 1995.; S. N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1996.; N. Kalyvas, *From pulpit to party. Party formation and the Christian democratic phenomenon*, „Comparative Politics” 1998, vol 31, nr 3, s. 293–312.

(NKWW) in Poland, the Civil Force (FC) and the "People's Movement" (PMP) in Romania, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKU-DS) and the "Beautiful Slovakia" (MS) in Slovakia, the "New Slovenia" – the Christian People's Party (NSI) in Slovenia. The above mentioned political parties mainly and primarily positioned themselves as Christian Democratic. However, in Central-Eastern Europe existed several parties which treated Christian Democratic ideology as a secondary one, together with the ideologies of nationalism and national-conservatism (the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ), liberalism and liberal-conservatism (the Civil Platform (PO) in Poland and the Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) in Romania), and also agrarianism and social-conservatism (the Polish People's Party, PSL) (for detailed information see Table 1).

In general, in the ideological context the phenomenon of party Christian democracy in Central-Eastern Europe countries in 1990–2014 was not homogeneous. Due to this, it is necessary to distinguish several groups of ideological positioning of political parties, which used principles of Christian Democratic ideology. *The first group* consists of political forces, which are mainly oriented on Christian Democratic principles (some of them still exist, and some stopped their activity): the Democratic Party (DP) in Bulgaria, the Christian Democratic Union – People's Party (KDU-CSL) and the Christian Democratic Union (KDS) in the Czech Republic, the Estonian Christian Democrats (EKD) in Estonia, the Christian Democratic Union (KDS) in Latvia, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LKDP) and the Christian Democratic Union (KDS) in Lithuania, the Centre of Comprehension (PC), the Party of Christian Democrats (PCD), the Christian Democracy (ChD), the Electoral Action of Catholics (WAK), the Non-Party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (BBWR), the Catholic Electoral Committee "Homeland" (O), the National Christian and Democratic Bloc for Poland (NCD – BdP) and the National Electoral Committee (NKWW) in Poland, the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) and the Civil Forces (FC) in Romania, the Democratic Party (DS), the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM) and the Christian Social Union (KSU) in Slovakia. *The second group* consists of those political forces, which combine ideological principles of Christian democracy and national-conservatism (as a kind of conservatism or combination of conservatism and nationalism): the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) in Bulgaria, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the "Pro Patria" and "Republic" Union (IRL) in Estonia, the Christian Conservative Social Union (KKSS), the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) in Lithuania, the Christian and Nationalistic Union (ZChN), the Movement for Republic (RdR), the Electoral Action "Solidarity" (AWS) in Poland, the New Generation Party – Christian Democrats (PNG-CD) in Romania. *The third group* is represented by the political parties, which synthesize principles of Christian democracy, social-conservatism (a kind of conservatism or combination of conservatism and socialism) and agrarianism: the Croatian Growth (HR), the Christian Party (KP) in Lithuania, the Polish People's Party (PSL), the Christian Democratic National

People's Party (PNT-CD) in Romania, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the "Beautiful Slovakia" (MS) in Slovakia, the Slovenian People's Party (SLS), the "New Slovenia" – the Christian People's Party (NSI) and the Christian Socialists (KS) in Slovenia. *The fourth group* consists of the political parties, which combine ideological principles of Christian democracy and liberal conservatism (synthesis of liberalism and conservatism or a kind of conservatism): the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) and the "People's Movement" (PMP) in Romania, the Civil Platform (PO) in Poland. The Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) in Hungary ideologically combines the principles of Christian democracy, national-conservatism and social-conservatism, and the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA) incorporates ideology of Christian democracy and the principles of protection the Poles in Lithuania (for detailed information see Table 1).



**Table 1.** Christian Democratic Parties, Their Ideological Positioning and Electoral Success in Central-Eastern European Countries (1990–2014)<sup>64</sup>

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Party	The year of party foundation	Ideological positioning of a party	Position within the left-right ideological spectrum (0 = max left, 10 = max right)	Participation in parliamentary elections, number of times; years of elections (percent of votes/number of mandates)	Participation in European parliament elections, number of times; years of elections (percent of votes/number of mandates)	Participation of a party in government cabinets or positioning of a party as a governmental one, number of times; years	Level of electoral support
DP	1896 (1989)	Center-right, Christian democracy	9,4	5: 1991 (k/+), 1994 (k/+), 1997 (k/+), 2001 (k/+), 2005 (k/+) 8: 1991 (34,4/110), 1994 (24,2/69), 1997 (28,8/69), 2001 (k/+), 2005 (k/+), 2009 (k/+), 2013 (1,4/0), 2014 (k/+)	–	1: 1997–2001 (k)	Falls/absent
SDS	1989	Center-right, Christian democracy, conservatism, national-conservatism, anticommunism	6,1	3: 2007 (4,7/0), 2009 (k/-), 2014 (k/-)	3: 2007 (4,7/0), 2009 (k/-), 2014 (k/-)	2: 1991–1992, 1997	Falls
HDZ	1989	Center-right, right ideology, Christian democracy, nationalism, national-conservatism, conservatism	7,1	7: 1990 (41,9/205), 1992 (44,7/85), 1995 (45,2/75), 2000 (24,4/46), 2003 (33,2/66), 2007 (35,9/66), 2011 (23,5/41)	2: 2013 (32,9/5), 2014 (41,4/6)	5: 2003–2006, 2006–2007, 2008–2009, 2009–2010, 2010–2011	Falls

<sup>64</sup> Legend: k – in the composition of electoral coalition or to provide support for governmental coalition; “+” – if is represented in the parliament; “-” – if is not represented in the parliament; DP – the Democratic Party (Аџвоспартицка партија); SDS – the Union of Democratic Forces (Унија на демократичне сили); HDZ – the Croatian Democratic Union (Хрватска демократска заједница); HR – the Croatian Growth (Хрватски раст); KDU-CSL – the Christian and Democratic Union – People’s Party (Кришћанска и демократска унија – Цркостованска странка ливаџ); KDS – the Christian Democratic Union (Кристанска демократска странка); EKD – the Estonian Christian Democrats (Естони Кришћидемократи); IRL – the “Pro Patria” and “Republic” Union (Ераконд Исмаја Реџ Публица Лиџ); KDNP – the Christian Democratic People’s Party (Кристанска демократска странка); KDS – the Christian Democratic Union (Кристанска демократска странка); KDS – the Christian Democratic Union (Кришћидемократи); KKSS – the Christian Conservative Social Union (Кришћидемократи); KP – the Christian Party (Кришћидемократи); LKDP – the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (Литванска кришћидемократи партија); TS-LKD – the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (Тевинес сјунга – Литванска кришћидемократи); LLRA – the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (Литванска акција литванска акција); AWS – the Electoral Action “Solidarity” (Акција Виборска Солитарност Павеџ); BBWR – the Non-Party Bloc for the Support of Reforms (Безпартијни Блок Вспераня Реформ); ChD – the Christian Democracy (Хришћанска Демократија); O – the Catholic Electoral Committee “Homeland” (Католики Комитет Виборска Олчезна); NCD – BdP – the National Christian and Democratic Bloc for Poland (Народово Хришћанско Демократијски Блок дла Польш); NKWW – the National Electoral Committee (Народови Комитет Виборска Виборска); PCD – the Party of Christian Democrats (Партија Кришћанска Демократија); PC – the Centre of Comprehension (Позумиение Центрум); RdR – the Movement for the Republic (Рух дла Речезпозолите); WAK – the Electoral Action of Catholics (Виборска Акција Католики); ZChN – the Christian and Nationalistic Union (Зпедоучение Хришћанско-Народове); PO – the Civil Platform (Платформа Обыварска); PSL – the Polish People’s Party (Польше Строничтво Лудове); CDR – the Romanian Democratic Convention (Конвенция Демократија Романиа); FC – the Civil Force (Форца Циџика); PMP – the Party – People’s Movement (Партија Личеара Популар); PNT-CD – the Christian Democratic National People’s Party (Партија Национал Таранесес Креџин Демократи); PNG-CD – the New Generation Party – Christian Democrats (Партија Нова Генератије – Креџин Демократи); PD-L – the Democratic Liberal Party (Партија Демократи-Либерал); DS – the Democratic Party (Демократијска странка); KDH – the Christian Democratic Movement (Кристанска демократијска унија); MKDM – the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (Мађарска кристанска демократијска унија); MS – the “Beautiful Slovakia” (Magnificat Slovakia); SDKU-DS – the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (Словенска демократијска кристанска унија – Демократијска странка); SDK – the Slovak Democratic Coalition (Словенска демократијска коалиција); KS – the Christian Socialists (Кришћански социјалисти); NSI – the “New Slovenia” – the Christian People’s Party (Nova Slovenija – Кришћанска људска странка); SLS – the Slovenian People’s Party (Словенска људска странка).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
HR	2010	Center-right, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	6,2	-	2: 2013 (2,6/0), 2014 (k/-)	-	Falls
<b>Czech Republic</b>							
KDU-ČSL	1919 (1992)	Centrism, Christian democracy, regionalism	5,8	8: 1990 (8,4/15), 1992 (6,3/15), 1996 (8,1/18), 1998 (9,0/20), 2002 (14,3/22), 2006 (7,2/13), 2010 (4,4/0), 2013 (6,8/14)	3: 2004 (9,6/2), 2009 (7,6/2), 2014 (10,0/3)	10: 1990-1992, 1992, 1993-1996, 1996-1997, 1998, 2002-2004, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2007-2009, 2014	Stable
KDS	1990	Right ideology, Christian democracy	8,1	2: 1990 (k/2), 1992 (k/10)	-	3: 1990-1992 (k), 1992 (k), 1993-1996 (k)	Falls/absent
<b>Estonia</b>							
EKD	1998	Center-right, right ideology, Christian democracy, Euroscepticism	7,6	3: 1999 (2,4/0), 2003 (1,1/0), 2007 (1,7/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
IRL	2006	Right ideology, Christian democracy, national-conservatism, conservatism	8,5	2: 2007 (17,9/19), 2011 (20,5/23)	2: 2009 (12,2/1), 2014 (13,9/1)	3: 2007-2009, 2009-2011, 2011-2014	Grows
<b>Hungary</b>							
KDMP	1943 (1989)	Right ideology, Christian democracy, national-conservatism, social-conservatism	7,4	6: 1990 (6,5/21), 1994 (7,0/22), 1998 (2,3/0), 2006 (k/23), 2010 (k/36), 2014 (k/16)	2: 2009 (k/1), 2014 (k/1)	4: 1990-1993, 1993-1994, 2010-2014, 2014-current	Stable
<b>Latvia</b>							
KDS	1991	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	6: 1993 (5,0/6), 1995 (k/5), 1998 (k/-), 2002 (k/-), 2006 (k/-), 2010 (0,4/0)	-	4: 1995-1997 (k), 1997 (k), 1997 (k), 1998 (k)	Falls
<b>Lithuania</b>							
LKDOP	1890 (1989)	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	4: 1992 (12,6/18), 1996 (10,4/16), 2000 (3,1/2), 2004 (1,4/0)	1: 2004 (2,8/0)	4: 1992, 1996-1999, 1999, 1999-2000	Falls/absent
KDS	1989	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	2: 1996 (3,2/1), 1996 (4,2/1)	-	-	Falls/absent
LLRA	1994	Centrism, Christian democracy, Euroscepticism, Poles' ethical issues	3,9	5: 1996 (3,1/1), 2000 (2,0/2), 2004 (3,8/2), 2008 (4,8/3), 2012 (5,8/8)	3: 2004 (5,7/0), 2009 (8,4/1), 2014 (8,1/1)	1: 2012-current	Grows
KKSS	2000	Center-right, Christian democracy, Christian-conservatism	6,5	3: 2000 (2,0/1), 2004 (2,0/0)	2: 2004 (2,6/0), 2009 (2,9/0)	-	Falls
Ts-LKD	2008	Center-right, right ideology, conservatism, Christian democracy, national-conservatism, liberal-conservatism, nationalism	7,4	2: 2008 (19,7/45), 2012 (15,1/33)	2: 2009 (26,9/4), 2014 (17,4/2)	1: 2010-2012	Falls

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
KP	2010	Center-right, Christian democracy, Christian-conservatism, social-conservatism	6,5	1:2012 (1,2/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
<b>Poland</b>							
ZChN	1989	Right ideology, nationalism, national-conservatism, Christian democracy	7,4	1:1991 (10,7/49)	-	3: 1991–1992, 1992–1993, 1993	Falls/absent
PC	1990	Center-right, Christian democracy, anticommunism	5,6	2:1991 (8,7/44), 1993 (4,4/0)	-	2: 1991, 1991–1992	Falls/absent
PCD	1990	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	3:1991 (1,1/4), 1993 (k/-), 1997 (k/+)	-	2: 1992–1993, 1993	Falls/absent
ChD	1991	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1:1991 (2,4/5)	-	-	Falls/absent
WAK	1991	Right ideology, Christian democracy	7,5	1:1991 (k/++)	-	-	Falls/absent
RdR	1992	Center-right, Christian democracy, conservatism, anticommunism	6,2	1:1993 (2,7/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
BBWR	1993	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1:1993 (5,4/16)	-	-	Falls/absent
O	1993	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1:1993 (6,4/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
AWS	1996	Center-right, right ideology, Christian democracy, conservatism	7,1	2:1997 (33,8/201), 2001 (5,6/0)	-	2: 1997–2000, 2000–2001	Falls/absent
NCD – BdP	1997	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1:1997 (1,4/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
NKWW	2004	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1:2004 (1,6/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
PO	2001	Center-right, liberalism, liberal-conservatism, Christian democracy	6,2	4:2001 (12,7/65), 2005 (24,1/133), 2007 (41,5/209), 2011 (39,2/207)	3:2004 (24,1/15), 2009 (44,4/25), 2014 (32,1/19)	3: 2007–2011, 2011–2014, 2014–current	Stable
PSL	1990	Center-left, agrarianism, social-conservatism, Christian democracy	4,2	7:1991 (8,7/48), 1993 (15,4/132), 1997 (7,3/27), 2001 (9,0/42), 2005 (7,0/25), 2007 (8,9/31), 2011 (8,4/28)	3:2004 (6,3/4), 2009 (7,0/3), 2014 (6,8/4)	11:1992, 1992–1993, 1993, 1993–1995, 1995–1996, 1996–1997, 2001–2003, 2004–2005, 2007–2011, 2011–2014, 2014–current	Stable
<b>Romania</b>							
PNT-CD	1989	Center-right, Christian democracy, agrarianism	5,5	5:1990 (2,6/12), 1992 (k/41), 1996 (k/83), 2004 (1,8/0), 2012 (k/1)	3:2007 (1,4/0), 2009 (1,5/0), 2014 (0,9/0)	3: 1996–1998, 1998–1999, 1999	Falls

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
CDR	1992	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,3	3: 1992 (20,0/82), 1996 (30,2/122), 2000 (5,0/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
PNG-CD	1999	Center-right, Christian democracy, Romanian nationalism	6,2	2: 2004 (2,2/0), 2008 (2,3/0)	2: 2007 (4,9/0), 2009 (k/-)	-	Stable
FC	2004	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	1: 2012 (k/3)	1: 2014 (2,6/0)	-	Falls
PD-L	2007	Center-right, liberal-conservatism, Christian democracy	5,4	2: 2008 (32,4/115), 2012 (16,5/52)	2: 2009 (29,7/10), 2014 (12,2/5)	4: 2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2012, 2012	Falls
PNMP	2013	Center-right, Christian democracy, classic liberalism	6,2	-	1: 2014 (6,2/2)	-	Grows
<b>Slovakia</b>							
DS	1989	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,2	4: 1990 (4,4/7), 1992 (3,3/0), 1994 (3,4/0), 1998 (k/+)	-	2: 1990-1991, 1991-1992	Falls/absent
KDH	1990	Center-right, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	7,1	8: 1990 (19,2/31), 1992 (8,9/18), 1994 (10,1/17), 1998 (k/+), 2002 (8,3/15), 2006 (8,3/14), 2010 (8,5/15), 2012 (8,8/16)	3: 2004 (16,2/3), 2009 (10,9/2), 2014 (13,2/2)	6: 1990-1991, 1991-1992, 1994, 2002-2006, 2010-2011, 2011-current	Stable
MKDM	1990	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,7	3: 1990 (k/+), 1992 (k/5), 1994 (k/7)	-	-	Falls/absent
KSU	1992	Center-right, Christian democracy	6,7	2: 1992 (3,1/0), 1994 (2,1/0)	-	-	Falls/absent
SDK	1997	Center-right, Christian democracy, liberal-conservatism	7,2	1: 1998 (26,3/42)	-	1: 1998-2002	Falls/absent
SDKU-DS	2000	Center-right, Christian democracy, liberal-conservatism	7,4	4: 2002 (15,1/28), 2006 (18,4/31), 2010 (15,4/28), 2012 (6,1/11)	3: 2004 (17,1/3), 2009 (17,0/2), 2014 (7,8/2)	3: 2002-2006, 2010-2011, 2011-current	Falls
MS	2012	Center-right, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	6,2	-	1: 2014 (1,2/0)	-	Falls
<b>Slovenia</b>							
SLS	1988	Center-right, conservatism, agrarianism, Christian democracy	6,7	8: 1990 (12,6/11), 1992 (8,7/10), 1996 (19,4/19), 2000 (9,5/9), 2004 (6,8/7), 2008 (5,2/5), 2011 (6,8/6), 2014 (4,0/0)	3: 2004 (8,4/0), 2009 (3,6/0), 2014 (k/1)	7: 1990-1992, 1997-2000, 2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2008, 2012-2013	Falls
KS	1992	Center-right, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	6,2	1: 1992 (1,1/0)	-	-	Falls/absent

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
NSI	2000	Center-right, right ideology, Christian democracy, social-conservatism	7.9	8: 1990 (13,0/11), 1992 (14,5/15), 1996 (9,6/10), 2000 (8,7/8), 2004 (9,1/9), 2008 (3,4/0), 2011 (4,9/4), 2014 (5,6/5)	3: 2004 (23,6/2), 2009 (16,6/1), 2014 (16,6/2)	6: 1990–1992, 1993–1994, 1994–1996, 1996, 2004–2008, 2012–2013	Falls

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Significantly, that Christian Democratic parties are usually interpreted as the “overall” parties, as they are based on the social support of various groups of voters and different social groups. But simultaneously, Christian Democratic parties can keep and in the case of necessity can *allay their religious identity*, which is interpreted as an initial peculiarity of such parties formation processes. R. Irving<sup>65</sup> states, that in their program plan Christian Democratic parties are based on the several independent principles as: Christian adherence to the simple human rights and liberal democratic values, class and transnational reconciliation. K. van Kersbergen<sup>66</sup> adds, that the main principles of Christian Democratic parties are integration, class compromise, accommodation and pluralism. It means, that Christian Democratic parties by all means try to reconcile and integrate many social groups (or even nations, when we speak of the EU level), whose interests differ. Namely this, makes Christian democracy isolated in the party-ideological context. It is mainly caused by the inner-party nature of Christian Democratic parties in most Central-Eastern European countries: these political forces have descended from an unusual organizational structure, which is divided into institutional factions and “wings” from the inside, and which has close organizational connections with trade unions, employers, women and youth organizations etc. The reason for such *heterogeneity* lies in the programs of Christian Democratic parties, where they accentuate the ideological attractiveness of religion from the perspective of various social classes. As a result, it is obvious, that Christian Democratic parties reveal great skills in developing and implementing the policy of *mediation*. This conclusion proves, that the political world-view of Christian Democratic parties is presupposed by the factual balance of power in the inner structure of these parties. In this light, the change of policy within the frames of Christian Democratic parties should be studied as the representation of the inner-party balance of power.

Along with this, social ideology (component) of Christian Democratic parties activity steps outside the doctrine of the catholic church (the so-called “great tradition”), because Christian Democratic political and civil movements stay beyond the social and political theory and practice of the Church<sup>67</sup>. Correspondingly, Christian Democratic parties are simultaneously interpreted as *religious and secular oriented*. At the same time, religion has always been the bearer of political attractiveness of Christian Democratic parties, mainly, due to the fact that it steps outside the boundaries of the social class. Respectively, Christian democracy is positioned as a *deeply integrative party ideology*. Together with this, on the basis of

<sup>65</sup> R. E. M. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*, Wyd. Allen & Unwin 1979, s. 18–19.

<sup>66</sup> K. van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Wyd. Routledge 1995.; K. van Kersbergen, *Contemporary Christian democracy and the demise of the politics of mediation*, [w:] H. Kitschelt, G. Marks, P. Lange, J. D. Stephens (eds.), *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999, s. 346–370.; K. van Kersbergen, *The Christian democratic phoenix and modern unsecular politics*, „Party Politics” 2008, vol 14, nr 3, s. 259–280.; K. van Kersbergen, A. Hemerijck, *Christian democracy, social democracy and the continental ‘welfare without work’ syndrome*, „Social Policy Review” 2004, vol 16, s. 167–186.

<sup>67</sup> K. van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Wyd. Routledge 1995.

such projects as "Comparative Manifesto Data"<sup>68</sup>, "Manifesto Project"<sup>69</sup> and "Comparative Political Data Set"<sup>70</sup>, which analyze party organization, political ideology, electoral appeals, governmental potential of the main political parties, it is empirically represented that Christian Democratic parties are non-structural<sup>71</sup>. However, these political forces, using the label "Christian Democratic" usually share characteristics and principles of conflict accommodation ideology, they are internationally connected via the Christian Democrat International/Centrist Democrat International/European People's Party.

The peculiarity of the *social constituent* of Christian Democratic parties activity and program orientation in Central-Eastern European countries is that most of them have succeeded in incorporating social-democratic (earlier socialist) models of the *state of general welfare*. At the early stage of their development Christian Democratic parties adhered to the stable principles of such models. The most important among them were: fair salaries for families and sympathy with poor people<sup>72</sup>. Moreover, the researchers state, that many social principles of Christian Democratic parties, mainly those, which concern the problems of social and political ethics, and workers' rights, have already been incorporated into the model of the state of general welfare<sup>73</sup>. But soon, some problems of the stable models were disclosed, as a result of which Christian Democratic parties' attempts, aimed at modification of current rules of social policy, have been revealed (similar processes take place in Western European countries<sup>74</sup>). In particular, the most interesting positions of Christian Democrats in the context of the state general welfare, concern not the problem of the amount of spent resources, but the goals they are spend for, and which social institutions are responsible for this. Thus, Christian Democratic parties are still the adherents of the models of the state of general welfare, but insist on their qualitative improvement. The question is, that there are different types of welfare regimes, i.e. different ways of combining social institutions with the aim to provide work

<sup>68</sup> I. Budge, H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, E. Tanenbaum, R. Fording, D. Hearl, H. M. Kim, M. McDonald, S. Mendez, *Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001.; H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, I. Budge, M. McDonald, *Mapping Policy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990–2003*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006.

<sup>69</sup> A. Volkens, P. Lehmann, N. Merz, S. Regel, A. Werner, O. P. Laceywell, H. Schultze, *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2013b*, Wyd. WZB Berlin Social Science Center 2013.

<sup>70</sup> K. Armingeon, P. Leimgruber, M. Beyeler, S. Menegale, *Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2004*, Bern 2006.

<sup>71</sup> T. Frey, *Die Christdemokratie in Westeuropa: der schmale Grat zum Erfolg*, Wyd. Nomos 2009.

<sup>72</sup> F. X. Kaufmann, *Religion und Modernität. Sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven*, Wyd. JCB Mohr 1989.; B. Fix, *Religion und Familienpolitik. Deutschland, Belgien, Österreich und die Niederlande im Vergleich*, Wyd. Westdeutscher 2001.; K. J. Morgan, *Working Mothers and the Welfare State: Religion and the Politics of Work-Family Policies in Western Europe and the United States*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 2006.; M. Opielka, *Christian foundations of the welfare state: strong cultural values in comparative perspective*, [w:] W. van Oorschot, M. Opielka, B. Pfau-Effinger (eds.), *Culture and Welfare State: Values and Social Policy in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. Edward Elgar 2008, s. 89–114.

<sup>73</sup> S. Kahl, *The religious roots of modern poverty policy: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Protestant traditions compared*, „European Journal of Sociology” 2005, vol 46, nr 1, s. 91–126.; S. Kahl, *Saving the poor: how religion shapes welfare-to-work policy in Europe and the United States*, Wyd. Yale University 2007.; K. van Kersbergen, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, Wyd. Routledge 1995.

<sup>74</sup> M. Seeleib-Kaiser, S. van Dyk, M. Roggenkamp, *Party Politics and Social Welfare: Comparing Christian and Social Democracy in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands*, Wyd. Edward Elgar 2008.

and social security: state services (compulsory insurance, social services, protection of labor rights), market mechanisms (professional pensions, private insurances), social organizations (religious charitable organizations for voluntary work), family (informal care)<sup>75</sup>. Nowadays, parties of Christian democratic orientation do not just advertise the model of the state general welfare (as social-democratic parties), but stand for such a state of general welfare, where the key characteristics, incorporated from the social-democratic, and also conservative-liberal regimes of social policy, systematically differ. All this is usually done in the context of *social Catholicism ideology*. As a result of this, the regime of Christian Democrats' social policy is "generous, but passive and transfer-oriented"<sup>76</sup>. *The crucial features of the Christian democratic state of general welfare are*: substitution of incomes, but not protection or creation of work places, privileges for families, but not individuals; fragmentation and partially public character of the main aspects of governance and implementation of social security policy, but not their centralization and state control; reproduction of social status, but not shuffle of social structure; "relative" obstruction of women access to the labor market. In the Christian democratic model the following points are *regulated*: professional insurance; combination of high-tempo of substitution and strict levels of employment protection; financing on account of special-purpose payments of employers' and employees' salaries.

Deeply analyzing the social constituent of activity and program orientation of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern Europe, we single out several *key patterns*, which are in the foundation of such parties' social orientation. These are justice, respect to life, conciliation, active sympathy, guardianship, ethic education, health and welfare, provision of housing, social revival, personality, family and community. Leading economic model of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern Europe is the *social market economy*, which involves combination of market economic principles and social services, which serve establishment of fair social equality. Consequently, the grounds of the social market economy are the principles of liberty and responsibility, competitiveness and solidarity. According to the Christian democratic ideology, a person has conscience and *social responsibility*. As a result, any society is socially responsible for its weak members. And because of that, Christian democracy strives not only for solidarity, but for solidarity as a goal of the social market economy. In this context, social policy is considered by parties of Christian democratic orientation as an instrument for social adaptation. First of all, it is aimed at such measures as preservation of the main income and worthy life in case of illness, early incapacity to work (accident or disability), death of a bread-winner, old age or periods of unemployment. Social policy includes maintenance of families, public housing, as well as youth and social security. While implementing it, inequality between people from various social groups, with various housing conditions or different

<sup>75</sup> G. Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Wyd. Polity 1990.

<sup>76</sup> S. N. Kalyvas, K. van Kersbergen, *Christian Democracy*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 2010, vol 13, s. 198.



levels of education must be taken into account. It must constantly pay attention to the risks, inherent in the market. But even in spite of this, parties of Christian Democratic orientation in different ways interpret social inequality and approach its security. The common thing is, that Christian Democrats justify social services, taking into consideration the necessity to protect human's dignity, paying no attention to the temporary positions on the labor market. Consequently, adjustment of social differences is not and has never been in the focus of Christian Democrats' social policy. On the contrary, social policy of Christian Democrats is aimed at ensuring temporary facilitation for those, who need it, in particular if they or their families cannot provide themselves. This approach corresponds with the principle of solidarity, which is in the centre of Christian social ethics or Christian democratic interpretation of the *subsidiary* principle. The main goal of the principle is to extend the person's abilities to take their own decisions and stay independent of the constant state's support.

What concerns *social insurance*, Christian Democrats do not depend on the state system of redistribution, which is financed from the tax proceeds repartition. On the contrary, Christian Democrats' approach is based on the form of social insurance, which is financed on account of employers' and employees' payments and is regulated irrespective of the state. It represents fundamental Christian democratic principles of personal responsibility, decentralization and subsidiarity. It is also actual in the context of demographical changes, increase in expenses in economy, growing globalization, when the system of matching insurance contributions becomes of great importance. Being devoted to the social market economy, parties of Christian democratic orientation often stand for introduction of elements of private and additional insurance. For instance, some Christian Democratic parties suggest financing the so-called "passive" policy on the labor market, i.e. unemployment and early retirement, on account of the contributions; other Christian Democratic parties – on account of training and retraining of elderly unemployed. However, in every approach freedom of individual life in the context of personal responsibility and dignity, and not dependence on social "gratuity" is clearly presupposed. That is why, the aim of Christian democratic social policy is to provide people with abilities of free development on the market, and to defend market mechanisms with the help of supervision and/or framework legislation. It allows every person to build their own life on the basis of freedom, social security and personal and social responsibility. The experience shows, that in spite of cyclic movements and temporary failures, which are almost inevitable in the course of market regulation, Christian Democrats' approach brings considerable success.

What concerns *family policy*, Christian Democrats stand for the ideas, which help families to become prosperous. Family policy is aimed at ensuring free development of a family and social justice, and offers stability and reliability of the family as a social institution. The family in the programs of Christian Democrats plays a fundamental and unchangeable role in upbringing personality and society in general, guarantees continuity of generations, undertakes

the crucial role in the processes of upbringing and education, ensures main needs of its members and helps to strengthen the feeling of solidarity between generations. It influences the comprehension of the family as a form of social policy, which provides social order on the basis of parental relations between parents and offspring. It is rather actual in the context of the issue, when family policy faces serious problems, which include demographical changes, changes in a family structure, and also cultural and ethnic interpretations of what the family and family life is. Usually, Christian Democrats in Central-Eastern Europe (on the analogy of Christian Democrats in Germany) determine the family as a social unit, where parents are responsible for their children and vice versa. Thus, the family covers all generations. At the same time, marriage is treated in the spirit of Christian democratic paradigm as a union between man and woman. Correspondingly, such definition of the family is based on the principle of subsidiarity, as for most people the family is a social institution, where children feel community and unity, as well as welfare and solidarity. However, in Christian democracy, a state is not the only supplier of family policy, as the services of family policy are provided via many interested parts, including government, church and private persons. All together they offer a wide spectrum of services, which represent numerous family actions and appropriate requirements. As a result of this, Christian democrats treat family policy in the future perspective and very often put it beyond the boundaries of social policy. The key rule of family policy, given by parties of Christian democratic orientation, is that the state must provide all families with more money. In equivalent, if possible.

But, in spite of this social orientation of Christian Democratic parties, they in course of 1990-2014 had different *electorate success*. The general conclusion is that Christian Democratic parties are less popular in Central-Eastern Europe, than in Western European countries. The least successful in electoral sense have been Christian democratic parties in such countries of Central-Eastern Europe as Latvia and Poland, moderately successful in Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria, and the most successful in Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia. It is also clear, that among all parties in the region, which have used Christian democratic ideology, the least successful in the electoral field were “pure” Christian Democratic parties (occurred in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Among them, the most successful in the electoral sense have become the following political forces: the Christian and Democratic Union – People’s Party (KDU-CSL) in the Czech Republic, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LKDP) and the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR). A bit more successful are parties, which have synthesized the principles of Christian democracy, social-conservatism (socialism and conservatism) and agrarianism. Among them, one can single out: the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) in Hungary, the Polish People’s Party (PSL), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) in Slovakia, the “New Slovenia” – the Christian People’s Party (NSI) and the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS). Even more successful are those parties, which have synthesized Christian democracy and

national-conservatism (nationalism and conservatism). Among them, it is necessary to name the following: the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) in Bulgaria, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) in Hungary, the "Pro Patria" and "Republic" Union (IRL) in Estonia, the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD), the Electoral Action "Solidarity" (AWS). The most successful appeared to Christian Democratic parties, which have synthesized the principles of Christian democracy and liberalism/liberal conservatism. Among them we can name: the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD), the Democratic Liberal Party (PD-L) in Romania, the Civil Platform (PO) in Poland, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKU-DS). The key conclusion is, that in general, electoral success of Christian Democratic political forces (of different ideological meaning) has been reduced from elections to elections. Comparatively stable electoral success have such parties of Christian Democratic orientation (or political forces, which secondary use the ideology of Christian democracy) as: the Christian and Democratic Union – People's Party (KDU-CSL) in the Czech Republic, the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) in Hungary, the Polish People's Party (PSL) and the Civil Platform (PO) in Poland, the New Generation Party – Christian Democrats (PNG-CD) in Romania, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) in Slovakia. As of 2014 electoral success of the following parties increased a bit: the "Pro Patria" and "Republic" Union (IRL) in Estonia, the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania, the "People's Movement" (PMP) in Romania. Classic parties of Christian democratic orientation had greater electoral success just after the collapse of the "real socialism" regimes. On the contrary, the parties, which combined Christian democracy with other traditional political ideologies, appeared to be more successful after the 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> elections. Parties, which combined the principles of Christian democracy and liberal conservatism were more successful after 2000, those, which united the principles of Christian democracy and social-conservatism and agrarianism had success during 1994–2010, and those, which combined the principles of Christian democracy and national-conservatism were popular during 1994–2010. Christian Democratic parties (with the elements of other ideologies) steadily belonged to the government parties in Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia (since 2007), Hungary (since 2010), Lithuania (since 2010), Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland (though in the latter there are no Christian Democratic parties in their classical interpretation<sup>77</sup>).

One of the reasons for weakness of Christian Democratic parties in the region is that in Central-Eastern Europe still exist secularized countries, and correspondingly, any fully religious oriented, in particular Christian Democratic, political forces have rather vague electoral chances for parliamentary representation. As T. Bale and A. Szczerbiak<sup>78</sup> state, there is only

<sup>77</sup> S. N. Kalyvas, K. van Kersbergen, *Christian Democracy*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 2010, vol 13, s. 194-195.

<sup>78</sup> T. Bale, A. Szczerbiak, *Why is there no Christian democracy in Poland – and why should we care?*, „Party Politics, 2008, vol 14, nr 4, s.479–500.

one exception in such an interpretation, namely Poland. This is the country, where “virtually” all people are Catholics. Besides, half of population go to the church regularly, and a lot of citizens are engaged in rural economy. Moreover, in Poland there is a strong social-conservative trade union movement, and since early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century anticlerical left-wing political forces have started their formation. The abovementioned conditions are rather favorable for establishing and flourishing of Christian Democratic parties<sup>79</sup>, but in fact they have not appeared. At the beginning of 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there were several attempts of self-manifestation and formation of Christian Democratic political forces, but the closest to the start of their formation were absolutely/fundamentally religious parties (for instance, the Christian National Union) or non-religious right-center (center-right) parties. However, none successful Christian Democratic party has appeared in Poland. Among the conditions, which usually promote formation and success of Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, only two existed in Poland: a great number of practicing Catholics and presence of the left-wing anticlerical political forces. But there were at least five factors, which prevented Christian democracy from appearing and flourishing: electorate of Christian Democratic parties was absent or was shared with other political parties (for instance, women-voters disproportionately voted for right-center parties and peasant-voters usually stood for agrarian parties); all potential participants of any electoral campaign in the right ideological spectrum were not discredited by participation or association in organizations of totalitarian/post-totalitarian past; Catholic idea and hierarchy did not wish to support one Christian Democratic party; the most important organizations of civil society, in particular the trade union “Solidarity”, in its time, refused to back up any of the right-center parties; in spite of anticlericalism, there was no special need to protect the interests of church, as nearly all right-center political parties have had much in common with Christian values, and have been the adherents of various social and political issues which were on the agenda. Even more negative factors existed in other Central-Eastern European countries. As a result of this, not classical or “pure” Christian Democratic parties are formed, but political forces, which despite their primary ideology, additionally use Christian and democratic principles in their programs and activity.

In general, in the context of electoral success of Christian Democratic parties in Central-Eastern European countries the following conclusions should be made. First of all, Christian Democratic parties (classic Christian Democratic parties are mentioned here) were the most successful and notable, and had a high electorate level just after the collapse of the “real socialism” regimes. But in most cases from elections to elections the influence of Christian Democratic parties started its gradual and considerable reduction. It can be chiefly explained, by the fact, that in early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Christian Democratic parties faced a dilemma, whether to keep their inner-party and strategic flexibility or to address appeals towards the narrower, but

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<sup>79</sup> S. N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 1996.; T. Frey, *Die Christdemokratie in Westeuropa: der schmale Grat zum Erfolg*, Wyd. Nomos 2009.

potentially more religious and loyal electorate. Those parties, which chose limited and narrow identity, faced the situation, when the number of voters was extremely short. Consequently, they underwent collapse after the 1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup> elections. However, those parties, which made a choice in favor of strategic flexibility, variability of party politics and "insufficient" determination of party identity (what was peculiar of most political parties and party policy in general in Central-Eastern European countries), managed to attract more considerable and stable support of electorate. But these political forces can be hardly interpreted as Christian Democratic, as in their case it is difficult to determine what ideology is a primary one for them.

Secondly, in spite of clearly manifested social orientation of Christian Democratic parties, in Central-Eastern European countries they have faced the problem, that the voters interpret the phenomenon of "Christian democracy" as the threat to cultural divergence (for instance in case of perception of abortions, religious lessons in schools, clerical influence on political life), not as the grounds for the social model of the market economy and the variant of supporting traditional values. Consequently, the union of political parties and church appeared to be very inefficient. That is why, Christian Democratic parties have become more secular and integrative, and as a result less structural. In some countries, it stabilized the level of electoral support for Christian Democratic parties, but in general the phenomenon of party Christian democracy in Central-Eastern European countries appeared to be ineffective in electoral perspective and conceptually vague.

In general, in the context of unity of the social policy principles in the program constituent and activity of Christian Democratic parties, but taking into consideration little electoral success of these parties in Central-Eastern European countries, the conclusion, offered by R. Leonardi ÷ P. Alberti<sup>80</sup>, seems to be rather reasonable: there are two approaches towards the study (theorization) and interpretation of parties of Christian and democratic orientation. The first is called rational, and treats Christian democracy as a "unitary player with a specified set of advantages and interests due to the problem of expenditures and profit". The second one is called reflective (reflexive), and interprets Christian democracy as a "conventionally political phenomenon with a successive set of notions, in fact, its representation in the political identity". In other words, it is reasonable to speak of constructivist and institutional vision of the essence of Christian Democratic parties as the articulatory phenomenon, which is characterized by political moderation and springs from the "consociation" pattern "more or less institutionalized over time and space"<sup>81</sup>.

<sup>80</sup> R. Leonardi, P. Alberti, *From dominance to doom? Christian democracy in Italy*, [w:] S. van Hecke, E. Gerard (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, Wyd. Leuven University Press 2004, s. 21–22.

<sup>81</sup> R. Leonardi, P. Alberti, *From dominance to doom? Christian democracy in Italy*, [w:] S. van Hecke, E. Gerard (eds.), *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, Wyd. Leuven University Press 2004, s. 24.